A significant offensive has commenced. On Saturday morning, American and Israeli forces initiated Operation Epic Fury, a military operation US President Donald Trump labeled as “massive and ongoing” against Iran. Trump urged the Iranian populace to depose their government once hostilities conclude. Iran swiftly retaliated, targeting Israel and US military installations across the region. Our specialists below provide their evaluations of the escalating conflict and its potential future trajectory.
Select an analysis from our experts below:
Nate Swanson: The objective is known—but little else is clear
Jonathan Panikoff: Iran’s regime faces unprecedented pressure; beware of ‘IRGCistan’
Matthew Kroenig: A campaign with significant risks and potential rewards
Jennifer Gavito: Iran’s response indicates no intention to deescalate
Daniel Shapiro: Trump’s directive raises questions for the American populace
Danny Citrinowicz: An operation with an ill-defined goal and no clear conclusion
Thomas S. Warrick: This conflict will have a domestic front in the United States
Celeste Kmiotek: This military action has serious international law implications
Rob Macaire: The path to a stable Iran has narrowed significantly
Alex Plitsas: Iran may be deliberately reserving some of its missiles
Hagar Hajjar Chemali: The operation will only hasten the Iranian regime’s economic collapse
C. Anthony Pfaff: Past strikes have followed a pattern of de-escalation
Michael Rozenblat: The era of the Islamic Revolution has concluded
Andrew Peek: The campaign now hinges on diplomacy, logistics, and Iranian opposition forces
Joe Costa: Maintaining the military action might affect preparedness for other concerns
Colin Brooks: The US holds a vital interest in subsequent developments
Tressa Guenov: Iran’s proxy networks are weakened but not neutralized
Kelly Shannon: True regime change demands more than aerial assaults
The objective is known—but little else is clear
By launching a massive coordinated assault with Israel on Iran, Trump is wagering that he can inflict sufficient damage on the Islamic Republic’s fundamental security and political structures to cause the regime’s downfall.
In opting to initiate this conflict, Trump has departed from his previous pattern of decisive actions that offered quick and low-cost exits. This represents an enormous gamble, accompanied by dubious legal justifications. Trump failed to articulate an immediate threat from Iran or a comprehensive strategy for Iran’s future should the United States succeed in overthrowing the regime. He also recognized the substantial danger to US forces stationed in the region.
As this military action progresses, I am focusing on three interdependent inquiries:
- Will Iran manage to impose costs on the United States? Facing an existential threat for the first time since the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian regime will likely employ all available resources, including its entire missile arsenal and proxy forces. The extent of damage Iran inflicts on the United States and Israel could very well seal the regime’s destiny.
- Public opinion consistently demonstrates strong American opposition to intervention in Iran. If there are considerable US casualties or adverse effects on global energy prices, will Trump maintain his commitment to this operation?
- Trump has defined a successful operation as one where the Iranian populace rises up to dismantle the Islamic Republic. Without ground troops or an armed opposition, this necessitates significant desertions within Iran’s security apparatus. Is there a concrete plan for how this will materialize?
Ultimately, while I remain deeply skeptical of this operation, it is crucial to acknowledge the reprehensible nature of the Iranian regime and my sincere wish to see the Iranian people liberated. I welcome the prospect of an Iranian government that is a responsible international actor and more accountable to its citizens. However, initiating a major conflict with a nation of 93 million people, boasting 2,500 years of history, substantial retaliatory capabilities, and no apparent internal opposition, carries considerable risk.
—Nate Swanson is a resident senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2015 onwards, he served as a senior advisor on Iran policy to successive administrations, most recently as director for Iran at the National Security Council.
Iran’s regime faces unprecedented pressure; beware of ‘IRGCistan’
Trump’s choice to initiate significant military actions against Iranian regime targets extends beyond his assurance to protestors that “help is on the way.” This represents an extensive operation aimed at eliminating the leadership, rather than merely a brief series of targeted, limited strikes.
However, neither public demonstrations nor aerial bombardments alone are likely to dismantle the regime’s hold on authority. Historical precedents suggest that it would require either a withdrawal of the various Iranian security forces, as observed in 1979, or at least a segment of the security establishment defecting to the opposition. Nevertheless, one of these two scenarios might be more probable now than in the past. The widespread economic hardship felt throughout the country, the severe water crisis, and the regime’s brutal suppression of protests—resulting in thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of deaths—render this period unique in the Iranian public’s post-revolution protest history.
Indeed, this time, a fundamental shift has occurred in Iran. Even if the regime doesn’t collapse immediately, it’s crucial to recall that the 1979 revolution took a full year to materialize. Therefore, this current wave of protests should be regarded as the dawn of a new era, not another failed attempt at national transformation.
Yet, the specific nature of this new era remains ambiguous. The regime’s demise is less likely to usher in democracy than it is to give rise to what some refer to as “IRGCistan”—a military-controlled state that might present a new supreme leader as a symbolic gesture to millions of conservative Iranians, but with actual power firmly consolidated within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Such an outcome would present three potential future directions.
Initially, an IRGC-governed Iran could pose a greater regional and domestic threat, adopting even more hard-line stances in its quest to cement power and ensure no rival insider can undermine it. Secondly, it might swiftly seek to garner public support by demonstrating increased flexibility for an agreement with the United States in exchange for economic revitalization through sanctions relief. Thirdly, it could lead to a period of instability and power struggles, compelling Western nations to decide the extent of their involvement in influencing the outcome.
—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.
A campaign with significant risks and potential rewards
While some contend that Trump failed to adequately justify US and Israeli military actions against Iran, this intervention became virtually unavoidable in January. Trump established a red line, cautioning the Iranian regime against killing protestors. The clerical leadership disregarded this warning, proceeding to massacre tens of thousands of their own citizens. Trump’s advisors likely asserted that he was compelled to uphold his threat to avoid jeopardizing US credibility. He was unwilling to emulate former President Barack Obama, who set a red line regarding Syrian chemical weapons use only to later retract it.
The sole remaining consideration at that point was the selection of targets. In late 2025, reports indicated that Israel and the United States were contemplating attacks on Iran’s revitalized missile program. Restricted strikes on these facilities might have been a logical initial step. Instead, observing the Iranian regime’s fragility in January, Trump, his advisors, and regional allies perceived a chance to permanently dismantle the Islamic Republic.
This chosen course of action carries increased hazards and the prospect of greater benefits. In prior engagements, such as Operation Midnight Hammer last summer, Iran’s military response was merely symbolic, aiming to avert a large-scale conflict with the United States. Now, facing an existential threat, the clerics have little incentive not to retaliate with their full capabilities. Positively, the Islamic Republic is a recognized member of the Axis of Aggressors and has represented one of the most substantial dangers to US national security for many years. Its removal from the geopolitical landscape could lead to a transformative enhancement of the regional and US global security posture.
—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.
Iran’s response indicates no intention to deescalate
Iran’s initial reaction to what now appears to be a US-Israeli campaign aimed at regime change confirms the regime’s perception of this as an existential crisis. Consequently, the kinds of de-escalatory measures previously observed in conflicts, including last summer’s twelve-day engagement, are currently unfeasible. The breadth, rapidity, and magnitude of Iran’s initial retaliatory strikes, extending to Gulf nations (excluding Oman), underscore the potential for a swift escalation into broader conflict and widespread upheaval. Already, regional air travel has ceased, and maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is diminishing.
During these nascent hours, as the United States and its allies adapt to the prospect of instability and economic turmoil, crucial questions that will shape the future trajectory remain unanswered. Paramount among these is the readiness and intention of Iran’s proxy forces to engage in the hostilities. In Iraq, Kataib Hezbollah has signaled its intent to target US installations in response to “American aggression,” while the Houthi movement in Yemen is anticipated to resume assaults on Red Sea shipping lanes. Furthermore, the Lebanese government has today cautioned Hezbollah against drawing the nation into conflict, but the militant organization’s response is yet to be seen.
Conversely, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have already denounced Iran’s attacks on several Middle Eastern countries, which resulted in at least one civilian fatality in Abu Dhabi. A vital indicator of how events might unfold will be whether Middle Eastern nations remove their restrictions on US use of their airspace for operations against Iran—or provide even more direct assistance to the campaign.
—Jennifer Gavito is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Iraq and Iran.
Trump’s directive raises questions for the American populace
Many Americans likely awoke this morning taken aback to learn that the United States was engaged in conflict in the Middle East. Trump, in his concise overnight address, mirroring his recent State of the Union speech, recounted the familiar (and accurate) litany of the Iranian regime’s transgressions: its pursuit of nuclear arms, its extensive ballistic missile program, its patronage of terrorist proxies, and its brutal suppression of its own populace. What he failed to articulate was the exigency or the immediate danger necessitating war at this time.
Ordinarily, prior to launching such substantial operations, presidents and their senior advisors have elucidated to the American people the rationale for significant military engagements and the overarching strategic goal they aim to achieve. They also typically brief Congress, enabling the people’s representatives to voice their perspective—potentially even authorizing or endorsing the operation—and seek out allies and partners to participate (or at least offer support). With the exception of a single briefing for eight congressional leaders, and, of course, Israel’s involvement, the president omitted these customary steps.
For the first time, the president did articulate a strategic aim in his statement—to alter the Iranian regime. As desirable as this outcome may be, it was a striking declaration for a president who has previously criticized regime-change conflicts, and who just days earlier seemed content to pursue a nuclear agreement (admittedly, one with slim chances of success). Yet, he also distanced the United States from direct responsibility for achieving regime change, urging the Iranian people to accomplish it. He can now assert that he fulfilled, perhaps belatedly, his January promise to Iranian protestors that “help is on the way.” And indeed, many protestors might welcome attacks against regime leaders and security apparatuses that quashed the demonstrations. However, the straightforward progression implied by his statement—US and Israeli strikes on nuclear, missile, and regime assets, leading to renewed protests, leading to the collapse of the regime—is far from guaranteed.
Iran’s air defenses, significantly diminished during the twelve-day conflict in June, are inadequate against the combined might of the US and Israeli militaries. Iran will sustain severe damage, which could indeed weaken the regime. Nevertheless, Iran will also deliver some blows, as it has already on the first day, with missile attacks against US bases and dozens of missiles directed towards Israel. If Iran can withstand the onslaught, continue firing ballistic missiles, and persist in quashing domestic dissent, US and Israeli air defense systems could soon be overextended, and US ordnance stockpiles depleted to perilously low levels. Thus, difficult decisions lie ahead, and challenging dialogues with the American public, should the regime, though battered and bruised, manage to endure aerial assaults, leaving the strategic objective of regime change unattainable through the methods the president has deployed.
—Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he served as the Director of the N7 Initiative. He held the position of US ambassador to Israel from 2011 to 2017, and most recently as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.
An operation with an ill-defined goal and no clear conclusion
The United States and Israel have initiated an unparalleled operation designed to cultivate conditions for regime change in Iran—achieved through the targeted assassination of high-ranking officials, assaults on governmental institutions, and attacks targeting Iran’s critical military infrastructure.
This does not constitute a conventional preemptive strike. No immediate Iranian threat prompted this action. Instead, the underlying rationale seems to be the leveraging of perceived regime vulnerability to instigate substantial political transformation within Iran.
The operation is predicated on the intelligence and operational superiority of the United States and Israel, coupled with unmatched firepower intended to exert such intense pressure on the regime that domestic elements—or the wider populace—might eventually rise against it.
Further complicating the situation is Iran’s apparent readiness for this confrontation and its resolve to maintain retaliatory capacities over an extended period. The potential for regional escalation is considerable—particularly after Iranian strikes against US bases in the Gulf and the prospect of Iranian-aligned entities in Yemen and Iraq becoming more directly involved in the conflict.
However, the gravest peril might be an extended operation that fails to bring about significant internal alterations in Iran and lacks a clearly delineated exit strategy, thereby leading to an indefinite conflict with no discernible end in sight.
—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. He is also a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies. He previously served for twenty-five years in Israel Defense Intelligence.
This conflict will have a domestic front in the United States
Trump declared the objective for this operation only after its commencement: continuous assaults designed to debilitate Iran’s security and strategic targets, including its leadership, until the Iranian populace deposes the regime. This constitutes a wager not merely within Iran’s airspace and territories but also on the domestic front. The American public, by a substantial majority, desired Trump to prioritize domestic concerns in his second term, with the economy being paramount. Since he did not solicit the backing of Congress and the American people beforehand, he will bear full responsibility for the outcome. Should it succeed, he might experience a modest domestic surge, but he risks a considerable setback to his internal agenda if it falters.
Trump’s post-conflict strategy for Iran appears founded on a manifestly unproven assertion: that the Iranian people will possess the capability to overthrow an entrenched, albeit weakened, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps resolutely clinging to power.
However, another unverified premise exists: that the United States can withstand any asymmetric endeavors the Iranian regime attempts within the United States. Given Iran’s distinct understanding of symmetry, Trump’s targeting of Iran’s leadership will almost certainly provoke efforts to target Trump and other high-ranking US officials. The Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the US Capitol Police will all face trials in the forthcoming weeks and cannot tolerate any failures. Iran will deploy every cyber tactic it can muster, challenging the Department of Homeland Security, the private sector, and US cyber defenses. Iran previously attempted, unsuccessfully, to interfere in US elections and would almost certainly fail to exert any influence this time. Even though the United States imports minimal oil from the Middle East, energy prices could surge, impeding the US economy.
This conflict will manifest a domestic dimension, and Trump must discover avenues for expanding support within the nation.
—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy in the US Department of Homeland Security.
This military action has serious international law implications
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) bears responsibility for countless domestic and international human rights transgressions and grave breaches of international law, including crimes against humanity against the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protestors. Indeed, after Trump pledged to “rescue” Iranians who initiated the most recent wave of widespread anti-regime demonstrations in January, the IRI responded by slaughtering, apprehending, and executing protestors by the tens of thousands—a magnitude unprecedented in Iran’s history and globally.
However, the US and Israeli military actions against Iran contravene international law. The deployment of force against a state is forbidden under the United Nations (UN) Charter, with exceptions for self-defense and Security Council endorsements. Self-defense must be a reaction to an imminent peril—and there is no evidence that such a threat existed for either the United States or Israel. Similarly, there are no Security Council authorizations. As such, this appears not only to violate the UN Charter but genuinely constitutes the crime of aggression as defined by the UN General Assembly and prohibited under customary international law.
US and Israeli strikes against Iran ignited an international armed conflict, and international humanitarian law (IHL) is now applicable. IHL mandates that attacks exclusively target combatants and legitimate military objectives, while implementing precautions to minimize incidental harm to non-combatants. Information is still emerging regarding the targets hit by US and Israeli strikes in Iran, and what Iranian strikes hit in Gulf states. Reports alleging dozens killed in US or Israeli strikes on a girls elementary school necessitate investigation, as do accounts of IRI strikes on a hotel in Dubai. If either was deliberately struck or if insufficient measures were taken to safeguard civilians, they would almost certainly represent clear breaches of international law. All parties to the conflict must ensure their actions adhere to IHL.
Much can be articulated about the necessity to restrain and hold accountable entities like the IRI, which perpetrate atrocity crimes against their domestic populations and globally. However, overt contraventions of international law against the IRI by the United States and Israel will only further erode global norms and exacerbate dangers for civilians worldwide.
—Celeste Kmiotek is a senior staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.
The path to a stable Iran has narrowed significantly
From a European viewpoint, considerable focus is placed on whether these military engagements contravene international law, though this factor appears not to have been a primary consideration in the decision-making process. Discussions concerning legality would need to center on the intent of the military intervention, yet that intent remains somewhat vague. Both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks upon the launch of the strikes mentioned targeting nuclear, missile, and naval capabilities, alongside urging the Iranian populace to overthrow the regime. “This is the opportune moment for action; do not let it slip away,” Trump instructed the Iranians. He also warned the IRGC and other security forces of “certain death” if they failed to surrender their weapons.
However, the IRGC alone comprises approximately 190,000 active personnel: it seems impractical for the president to eliminate all of them or, indeed, to assure their safety if they abandon their positions. If the Iranian regime emerges from this devastated, wounded but still in control, its leaders will proclaim mere survival as a triumph. But if these assaults are sufficiently destructive to bring down the regime, notwithstanding its preparations and durability, it is conceivable that the entire state authority could crumble alongside it. In either scenario, the route to a stable resolution that neutralizes Iran’s menace to its neighbors and its people’s subjugation may have become less accessible.
—Rob Macaire is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He previously served as British ambassador to Iran.
Iran may be deliberately reserving some of its missiles
The joint US-Israeli military actions against Iran signify a conclusive escalation, intended not merely to penalize but to fundamentally alter the strategic balance. Trump has articulated that the goal is regime change, pursued via sustained US aerial and naval operations, which are designed to enfeeble Tehran’s coercive apparatus while bolstering protest movements on the ground.
The initial wave of strikes appears precisely tailored to diminish Iran’s retaliatory capacity and security infrastructure: ballistic missile facilities, drone manufacturing and launch sites, governmental and military figures, and crucial naval installations connected to potential attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. There are also indications of targeted strikes aimed at top Iranian leaders, though assessments of battle damage remain incomplete, and confirmation of high-level casualties is pending.
The overarching strategic reasoning is uncomplicated. Nuclear negotiations had stalled over non-negotiable fundamental principles. Instead of accepting a gradual stalemate, Washington and Jerusalem seem to have concluded that changing the key actors, rather than just the terms, was imperative. Force, within this framework, is being employed to degrade capabilities and shift Tehran’s strategic calculations.
Iran’s reaction so far has been measured and logical. It has targeted significant US military posts throughout the region: the US Navy Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Al Dafra in the UAE, and Ali Al Salem in Kuwait.
Iran was estimated to possess approximately 2,000–3,000 medium-range ballistic missiles, 6,000–8,000 short-range systems, and thousands of drones. We have not yet observed overwhelming saturation attacks intended to overpower multi-layered air defenses. It is uncertain if this is due to US and Israeli strikes on missile inventories, Iran withholding missiles, Iran testing defenses, or a combination of these factors.
Whether Tehran is purposefully holding back reserves, scrutinizing defensive responses, or experiencing greater incapacitation than publicly acknowledged remains ambiguous. The most credible explanation might encompass all three possibilities.
—Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the head of the Atlantic Council’s Counterterrorism Project, and a former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
This conflict will only hasten the Iranian regime’s economic collapse
While many are deliberating the strategic rationale behind military actions against Iran pertaining to regime change, a crucial fact is being overlooked: the Islamic Republic of Iran lacks a viable economic foundation. Irrespective of these strikes, this regime was already in a state of financial deterioration. It was progressing towards an economic implosion that could have independently precipitated its downfall.
In October 2025, Ayandeh Bank, one of Iran’s largest financial institutions, experienced a collapse. This bank was controlled by regime elites, serving as a conduit for their corruption, and it incurred excessive spending on failed opulent projects. The Iranian regime swiftly absorbed Ayandeh’s liabilities and integrated it with Bank Melli, the nation’s largest state-owned lender. The regime also engaged in extensive printing of rials, causing the already depreciated currency to plunge further and inflation to surge dramatically overnight, prompting shopkeepers and subsequently large segments of the Iranian populace to protest. The failure of Ayandeh Bank was the catalyst for the demonstrations that led to the regime’s subsequent brutal suppression of its own citizens.
At least five additional major banks in Iran—including Sepah, Sarmayeh, Day, Iran Zamin, and Mellat—face the prospect of a similar collapse. This information comes from economists and Iran’s own central bank, which earlier in 2025 issued a warning that eight unnamed banks were at risk of dissolution. Due to years of sanctions and economic mismanagement, the regime lacks the billions required for bailouts, nor will its international counterparts intervene to salvage it. Such a scenario would lead not only to an intensified economic crisis but also to widespread defaults and a disruption in government-provided services and salaries. This would imply that the regime’s security forces could cease receiving pay, and dictators’ power often hinges on the loyalty of their militaries, thereby creating a significant vulnerability for the regime’s continued existence.
I cannot vouch for the certainty of this scenario—it represents an evaluation of potential developments in Iran, regardless of military strikes. However, comprehending the regime’s economic state, in conjunction with its other vulnerabilities since the twelve-day conflict last June, offers insight into the motivations behind the United States and Israel’s decision to undertake their operations now. The regime was already perched precariously. This operation likely precipitates its downfall.
— Hagar Hajjar Chemali is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. She previously served on the White House National Security Council and at the US mission to the United Nations.
Past strikes have followed a pattern of de-escalation
There are two probable outcomes to this latest intensification of the conflict with Iran: the conflict escalates into an asymmetrical war with Iran, or, following a series of retaliatory strikes, it subsides as it has in previous instances. Regarding the former, the extent of any escalation is constrained by both parties’ inability to resolve their differences. For Washington, this implies a regime change to one more amenable to the United States, Israel, and the broader Western bloc. For Tehran, it signifies expelling the US military presence from the region. For both adversaries, this demands a greater military commitment than either appears willing or able to provide. While the US might hope that this current wave of attacks will galvanize protests capable of overthrowing the regime, the fact that Tehran’s capacity to suppress protestors remains unimpaired suggests that, while a worthy aim, such an outcome is improbable. Without a method to neutralize the opposing side’s ability to resist, only asymmetrical tactics like air strikes and terrorist assaults remain.
If the foregoing holds true, then the latter outcome is more plausible. For instance, in October 2024, Iran executed a massive ballistic missile and drone assault against Israel in retaliation for Israel’s actions against Lebanese Hezbollah, including the assassination of its leader Hassan Nasrallah. Israel responded to the Iranian attack by targeting missile production facilities in Iran, emphasizing their limited scope. In turn, the Iranians minimized the damage and thus the perceived necessity to react further. This trend has been observed repeatedly for some time, extending back at least to the Iranian response to the US elimination of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 and the US retaliations to proxy attacks against its personnel in Iraq. Whether this pattern will persist depends on the breadth of the responses. As long as both sides confine their actions to military targets, de-escalation is more probable. Should, however, Tehran carry out terrorist attacks against non-combatants and civilian infrastructure—more probable if it perceives its survival to be in jeopardy—then an escalation to a broader, regional conflict becomes the sole recourse for either party.
—C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs
The era of the Islamic Revolution has concluded
The joint US-Israeli military campaign is in progress. Until clarity emerges, it will be difficult to ascertain precisely who and what was successfully targeted, and who will remain influential in Iran after the initial assaults. Reports indicating that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was a primary target from the outset offer a promising beginning, hopefully alongside the key political and military advisors vital for the regime’s continuity. The prominent individuals who have sustained the regime for decades, amassing hundreds of collective years of experience, would need to be eliminated to allow Iranians to determine their own destiny.
With this, the operational goal has been established: to strike the foundational elements of the regime to such an extent that its post-conflict existence would be untenable politically, economically, and militarily.
After years of barbarity, venality, and the infringement of every right Iranians inherently deserve, they can now witness the culmination of this regime’s trajectory. The Islamic Revolution’s experiment has reached its end.
Moving forward, the pressure on the regime will intensify, and the foundation for an opposition movement to emerge will be prepared. The crucial question is: Who will seize this opportunity to unify the populace and offer an alternative to this clerical government—and at what point?
Now is the time for the Iranian opposition, both domestically and in the diaspora, to grasp this pivotal moment. Should the regime endure this conflict, it is challenging to envision another chance for transformation in the future. However, if the opposition succeeds in coalescing around a mutually accepted leader or group of leaders who can credibly assert themselves as the sole legitimate authority—then Iranians may indeed have a prospect for a brighter tomorrow.
—Michael Rozenblat is a visiting research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, from the Israeli security establishment.
Several factors prompted the US and Israel to attack Iran—and they’re pursuing various goals
The joint US-Israel military action targeting Iran comes after nuclear discussions in Geneva this past week that failed to yield an outcome agreeable to the United States. Moreover, the strikes coincide with both the United States and Israel perceiving the Iranian regime to be at its most vulnerable state since its inception in 1979, where stagnant economic conditions and escalating brutality by the regime signify a government compelled to resort to extreme violence to maintain authority.
Subsequent to the October 2023 assaults on Israel and the ensuing military engagements, Iran has lost its most vital proxy forces in the region, along with its client state in Syria. This diminution of strategic depth, coupled with an increasingly aggressive defensive posture by Israel, likely impelled Jerusalem to seize what it views as a historic opportunity to eliminate what it considers its final remaining existential threat in the area.
For the United States, the operation is presumably intended to achieve multiple strategic aims, including the eradication of Iran’s nuclear program and an end to its reliance on proxies and missile capabilities to menace its neighbors. It may also have recognized an occasion to reshape Iran and the wider region in a manner that could see the clerical regime in Tehran superseded by an alternative, though the nature of what might follow remains uncertain.
Regional nations such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE will probably continue to advocate for de-escalation in the coming days, as regional instability jeopardizes their economic development strategies centered on energy exports, tourism, and attracting affluent expatriates. Already, there are reports of civilian casualties in the UAE from debris falling after an Iranian missile was intercepted by air defense systems. However, thus far, the Iranian regime has demonstrated its readiness to target US assets in Gulf countries, and it is likely to intensify its attacks if it interprets the operations by the United States and Israel as aiming to overthrow it.
—Nic Adams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He most recently served as a professional staff member on the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as senior advisor to Senator John Cornyn (R-TX).
The campaign now hinges on diplomacy, logistics, and Iranian opposition forces
This is the decisive confrontation. The foundational components for Trump’s military action against Iran will encompass diplomacy, logistics, and ground-level political dynamics. Diplomacy has, thus far, progressed favorably. Although US partners such as the UAE have sustained hits, the immediate aftermath has seen constructive engagement from the previously estranged regional ally Saudi Arabia, rather than a disengagement from the US campaign. This contrasts with earlier missile strikes in 2022 against Abu Dhabi, which led to an Emirati softening of its stance towards Iran.
The logistical aspects remain obscure to external observers. Patriot and Tomahawk missiles are in high demand globally, and manufacturing is sluggish. However, the administration will have benefited from the suspension of additional Presidential Drawdown Authority tranches for Ukraine and the continuous six-week military buildup it has executed in the region.
The political landscape is unpredictable for all. This is a conflict aimed at regime change, endeavoring to reactivate essentially dormant protest movements. The most crucial initial factor is to secure an area relatively unencumbered by security forces, where opposition factions can recuperate and rearm. They will also require some weaponry to prevent a repeat of January’s events or to establish a tactical connection with US air support. Furthermore, the opposition will need to attract the upper working class and lower middle class, which constitute the regime’s core support base. Additionally, the aerial assaults urgently need to eliminate Khamenei, if he is not already deceased, and dismantle the government’s media infrastructure. Any struggle for regime change fundamentally involves a contest for legitimacy, which is ultimately secured through symbols and force.
—Andrew Peek is the director of the Adrienne Arsht National Security Resilience Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Maintaining the military action might affect preparedness for other concerns
While the United States maintains overwhelming conventional military superiority, Iran and its proxies possess the capability to inflict substantial costs through missiles, naval mines, drones, swift attack craft, cyber operations, and other asymmetric instruments—thereby elevating the risk of broader regional instability. Reports indicate that Iranian forces have already targeted US and allied assets in the Gulf, including locations in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. Some oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have also been suspended.
Containing a prolonged regional escalation will necessitate considerable US military assets and could detrimentally affect readiness for other vital objectives, including those concerning China. A pivotal question is whether the United States possesses sufficient high-end armaments and has secured adequate allied backing—such as access, basing, overflight permissions, intelligence sharing, and logistical support—to sustain an extended campaign, if required, without incurring immense costs to other paramount global US interests.
Another core issue is the “theory of victory”—how military intervention would translate into enduring political outcomes. Will this result in the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program? In historical instances, such as the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, regime change was militarily accomplished, but the aftermath proved expensive and destabilizing. It remains entirely ambiguous who would fill the power vacuum and whether their perspectives on the nuclear program would significantly diverge from the existing regime’s.
How would the United States manage the ramifications of a destabilized or even collapsed Iranian government? These hazards must undeniably be balanced against the paramount national security interest of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weaponry. Therefore, it will be crucial to comprehend the administration’s rationale on these and related matters in the forthcoming days.
—Joe Costa is the director of the Forward Defense program of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Colin Brooks: The US holds a vital interest in subsequent developments
As the global community observes the ongoing strikes in Iran, it is evident that the joint US-Israeli military intervention aims not only to obliterate Iranian military capabilities but also to actively dismantle the regime—targeting its political and security apparatus across its past, present, and future manifestations. What transpires next carries immense ramifications for the region and American strategic concerns.
No one should grieve the demise of a regime that has perpetrated violence against its citizens, militarized sectarian and religious identities, sustained terror proxies, armed Russia’s war in Ukraine, and murdered Americans. Iran has consistently acted as a catalyst for instability in the Middle East. It is also clear that the regime persistently engaged in dishonest negotiations, unwilling to yield on its nuclear program, ballistic missiles, or backing for terrorist groups. Operation Epic Fury constitutes a welcome development.
However, the United States and its allies possess a crucial stake in future events. Neither the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MeK) nor the Pahlavi family offer simple solutions. America’s historical experiences with regime change—from the post-Second World War era, through the Cold War, to the case of Chalabi in the Iraq war—have yielded inconsistent, often unforeseen outcomes.
Assuming the theocratic government is overthrown, what then is America’s role in a post-Ayatollah Iran? What policies ought the US adopt?
It is apparent that prior US-Iran policies of containment, isolation, engagement, or addressing the nuclear question in isolation, have all failed to adequately address the challenge. Similarly, with the singular exception of the Marshall Plan, American-led post-conflict strategies have demonstrated a significant rate of failure. Valuable lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan should be paramount for US policymakers.
While the US must maintain a clear perspective on the enduring threat posed by Iranian militias, residual nuclear ambitions, or another hardline figure assuming control of Iran, the United States is not obligated to take ownership of the post-conflict Iranian landscape. America should not contemplate investing in extensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration endeavors, consider a sustained American troop presence, or elevate an Iranian leader of its choosing to a position of power.
Instead, the United States should forge consensus with its regional partners regarding any emergent political leadership, confine instability within Iran’s borders, and utilize economic instruments to influence developments.
Ultimately, the US retains potent non-military instruments to encourage appropriate conduct from any new Iranian government. As demonstrated in Syria, an existing sanctions framework serves as a powerful lever to guide any new administration and stimulate change.
The same holds true in Iran. Iran is among the most heavily sanctioned nations globally. This framework furnishes the US and its partners with formidable tools to shape the subsequent political evolution.
— Colin Brooks is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a former senior professional staff member on the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Iran’s proxy networks are weakened but not neutralized
For several weeks, as indicated by media reports, intelligence agencies globally have been vigilant for the heightened potential of Iranian asymmetrical retaliation through “sleeper cells” or other proxy factions, either preceding or in response to today’s offensive on Iran.
Iran’s intricate proxy networks are debilitated but not entirely eradicated. Even if high-ranking regime officials are eliminated in the strikes, the IRGC and other intelligence branches have presumably made preparations for such an eventuality. Iran might seek to execute assassination attempts, terrorist acts, cyber assaults, abductions, or sabotage against civilian or military targets—all activities it has been associated with since the 1980s across diverse nations like Albania, Argentina, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Sweden. It could still endeavor to activate Houthi or Hezbollah affiliates, for example, or conduct additional expeditionary operations via recruited individuals in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere.
The Iranian regime possesses a protracted institutional memory and is known for pursuing targets for decades, including conspiracies and attempted attacks against dissidents abroad and US government personnel. It is noteworthy that Iran did not appear to deploy its most extreme instruments of disruption following the US-Israeli attack last June, though it predictably utilized cyber, drone, and other forms of aggression. However, with the regime now confronting the most substantial physical assault against its leadership, it remains to be seen if and how this will modify Iran’s enduring capacity to sow turmoil and inflict damage.
—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
True regime change demands more than aerial assaults
The Iranian populace has articulated clearly over the past several years that the Islamic Republic must cease to exist. The United States—both the Biden and Trump administrations—could have undertaken measures to provide substantial assistance to Iran’s anti-regime movement since the Woman, Life, Freedom movement of 2022-2023 but opted against it. Instead, both administrations endeavored to revitalize a nuclear accord with Iran without addressing human rights, an approach that conferred legitimacy upon the regime and would have provided it with a vital lifeline had the negotiations been successful.
The Iranian people persevered independently in their pursuit to end the regime’s subjugation, risking their lives in widespread protests during December and January. The regime severed their communication with the global community, massacred thousands, detained tens of thousands, and instigated a campaign of terror that has continued unabated. Trump’s January promise that “help is on the way,” followed by his inaction while the regime murdered thousands with impunity, was morally reprehensible. It also eroded the Iranian people’s trust in the United States.
The fact that the Trump administration’s renewed discussions with the Islamic Republic in recent weeks excluded the Iranian people as a topic of negotiation constituted an additional affront to Iranians who have been jeopardizing everything for liberty.
The Iranian people are not mere instruments. Trump and Netanyahu have urged them to overthrow their government. However, the United States and Israel are offering only bombardments from the skies. Iranians were already mobilizing again this past week, as mourning families evinced defiance in cemeteries and university students confronted security forces. The eruption of war compels these protests to halt while Iranians prioritize safety. Bombings, therefore, render a popular uprising more challenging to orchestrate. If the United States and Israel are genuinely committed to regime change, they must provide more than just aerial strikes against Iran.
Successful regime transformation will necessitate considerable material support for the Iranian people, coordination with ground-level dissidents, and meticulously devised strategies for potential developments after the regime’s collapse. The Trump administration, thus far, appears to lack such a blueprint. Should the regime indeed fall—as it justly deserves—it is in the interest of the United States for the Iranian people to succeed in establishing the secular democracy rooted in human rights and the rule of law that they have long yearned for. Yet, other forces are at play that could steer Iran’s future in a less democratic direction. The question is, will the United States assist the Iranian people in forging a positive path forward, or will it abandon them to their fate once the bombs cease to drop?
——Kelly J. Shannon is a visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. She is also a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group.